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IS IT TIME FOR A JOINT FORCES LOGISTICS COMPONENT COMMANDER
"Focused Logistics is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, supplies, and support in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantities, across the full range of military operations…Through transformation innovations to systems, processes, and organizations, focused logistics will provide the joint warfighter with support for all functions."
Focus Logistics Campaign Plan
The logistics environment is changing with the transformation of the armed forces. The
Focused Logistics Campaign Plan describes a logistics system that replaces mass with speed of movement and precision. 1 All services are reducing inventory to decrease the size of the logistics footprint and the cost of moving and maintaining material. Future concepts of logistics envisage distribution on the move with combat forces. 2 These concepts will create an environment that puts a premium on transportation management, inventory control, and precision delivery. History has shown that a system based on speed and control requires centralized direction and prioritization.
Current doctrine does not provide the joint forces commander with a uniform way to control logistics. The Focused Logistics Campaign plan lists five ways a theater commander can manage logistics. 3 All are ad-hoc approaches that do not provide real control over theater logistics and do not meet the needs of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in the logistics environment envisioned by senior leaders.
A velocity based logistics system has characteristics that are similar to airpower the principles that apply to airpower, also apply to logistics. The challenge is how to best control limited assets while maximizing the effects desired by the Joint Force Commander. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) must deliver airpower at the right place at the right time with the right effect with limited assets. The JFC needs a method to control logistics across the theater. It is time for a command and control system similar to the one used for airpower. This paper will review theater logistics command and control, examine trends in logistics, and recommend a theater command and control concept. Finally, it will show how this approach will meet the needs of the future logistics environment.
HISTORY OF THEATER LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL
There were chronic logistical command and control problems in recent operations. These problems include; In-Transit Visibility (ITV); ordering discipline and control of requisitions; and use of service specific systems. These problems were mitigated by mass and time.
Unfortunately, we many not have the luxury of mass and time in the future.
Our logistics system is a mass based just-in-case system, the factors that molded this system were: the industrial revolution, mass production and the U.S. industrial capacity, and primitive transportation and information systems. The weakness of these systems forced logisticians to stockpile equipment as close to the war-fighter as possible and provide the material needed for any contingency. 4 Industrial age mass production and the simplicity of weapons systems made it cost effective to produce large quantities of spare parts and materials. This system was very successful, thanks to the United States' industrial capacity.
We simply overwhelmed our opponents with stuff.
Risk for logisticians is not having the right item when and where it is needed. In the past, risk was minimized by moving much more than the minimum required equipment to the fight. However, as the industrial age gave way to the information age new possibilities emerged because, for the first time, information systems were available that could provide the visibility to control assets. In an effort to cut costs and improve flexibility the services are also working to reduce inventories and limit the material they moved forward.
OPERATION DESERT STORM
Operation Desert Storm was a mass-based logistics war, 7 but it was also the first time theater wide control of all Service logistics was attempted. There was no central control of logistics prior to the start of operations. 8 The plans that did exist envisioned Combat Support and Combat Service Support forces flowing with combat units during a buildup phase. However, Iraq quickly occupied Kuwait and the possibility that Saudi Arabia was next caused the theater commander to send combat units to the theater first, with out their support units.
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The force was critically logistically unsustainable for the initial period of Operation DESERT SHIELD. 11 In an effort to get control of logistics, General Norman Schwarzkopf, the theater commander, appointed US Army Central Command (ARCENT) as the theater logistics focal point. Lieutenant General John Yeosock, ARCENT Commander in turn appointed, Major
General Gus Pagonis and thus also ARCENT Support Command (Provisional) as his logistics coordinator, for the theater commander. 12 Unfortunately, he was playing catch up and MG Pagonis focused on Army logistics requirements and never got control of Air Force or Navy theater logistics.
13
There was a lack of ITV, low confidence in the system, and over requisitioning.
Requirements were based on previous days requests not necessarily actual need because the logistics information system could not provide that information. Users did not have confidence in the system, so they double and triple requisitioned items in order to get badly needed material. 14 The lack of discipline in requisitions and numerous high priority requisitions created an airlift demand six to seven times capacity.
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The logistics system accomplished its mission because Iraq gave the United States and its allies time to use mass to overcome problems. Gen John Foss of the US Army noted that "probably the worst decision of Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the decision to stock 60 days of supply. It drove up force structure, it cost the Army lots of money and time and over 90% was back hauled. 16 This would not be the last time the US moved much more material than it needed.
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE
During Operation Restore Hope, in Somalia, there was also no Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), combat troops flowed in unsynchronized with support, ITV was not achieved, and users lacked confidence in the system. Combat troops were sent in first; there was an urgent need for combat force to provide security. However they were sent in without the logisticians required to operate sea and air ports of debarkation. 17 This led to even more changes to the TPFDD and cargo was shipped that was not needed. Because there was no ITV, logisticians had to physically check arriving items to determine their owner and destination.
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People lost confidence in the system and resorted to direct requests to action officers, general officers, and home station through email and phone. 19 There was no joint control of logistics and significant duplication of effort. Again, problems in visibility, control, and confidence in the system were overcome by mass.
OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR
The same problems returned during Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. Operation Joint
Endeavor was planned quickly and again combat forces were not synchronized with logistics forces. Conflicts arose over movement of support force supplies and combat forces.
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Operation Joint Endeavor was the first operation where logisticians attempted to achieve total asset visibility, but the technology was immature and there was not enough equipment in the field to monitor assets moving into the theater. 22 Again, we relied on mass to overcome control problems. 
COMMON HISTORICAL TRENDS
Several common problems in recent operations contributed to the reliance on mass and time. First, in each case logistics planning did not prepare for the actual operation that took place; plans were developed on the run and they changed at execution. When plans changed the system could not keep up and control of material was lost. Second, confidence in the system broke down and units developed their own work-arounds or overwhelmed the system with duplicate requests. These problems were overcome by the shear weight of the logistics effort. Assets were not controlled, they were moved along in the tidal wave of material moving to the fight. Third, information systems had not matured enough to provide total asset visibility.
There has been a steady improvement in ITV since Operation Desert Storm, but not enough to provide commanders with the ability to manage critical assets let alone the overall logistics effort. Finally, although the theater commander always had the authority to control logistics he never had the capability to perform that function, ad-hoc command and control and improvisation were the norm.
TODAY'S LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT
Operation Iraqi Freedom was fought using the latest logistics doctrine and information systems. While lessons learned are just now becoming available, some things are clear. of Joint Operations, says that Combatant Command (COCOM) includes directive authority for logistics and gives the combatant commander authority to shift logistics as required to accomplish his mission. 26 At the same time Title 10 USC gives responsibility to fund for logistics support to each of the Services. 27 In current doctrine the combatant commander serves as a facilitator and coordinator of Service requirements; he is expected to facilitate the efforts of the individual Services in his theater and ensure their concepts are feasible and synchronized with his operational plan. 28 While the combatant commander is given directive authority for logistics, joint doctrine specifies a role that is managerial in nature and focuses on coordinating and planning to ensure smooth flow of material to the theater. However, this causes problems because the JFC's managerial role is weak and control is lost when the plan changes. In the last five major operations we either don't have a plan or deviated from it. Compounding the problem is the fact that each Service has its own logistics systems for its specialized needs.
These systems allow little cross communication.
OPERATIONS USING CURRENT DOCTRINE
Current doctrine was employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with mixed results. OIF was supported with a combination of prepositioned stocks and material movement from other theaters. According to Brig Gen Robert Cone, "we were able to move about a quarter of the amount of stuff to the theater." 30 CENTCOM had a detailed logistics plan based on the combat operations plan. But the plan changed many times, Brig Gen Cone said, "deployment planning demands flexibility and adaptation that exceeded the capabilities of the mobilization and deployment process… When your ability to access basing and overflight is constantly changing you have to have a system that is flexible." 31 The plan changed at execution, as it has every time since Desert Storm, and the logistics system could not keep up.
In-transit visibility improved to the theater. According to Gen Cone we saw good things at the joint level of logistics and some very good things in terms of in-transit visibility. We didn't have to move an iron mountain, we had iron hills because we could lower the number of days of supplies that we needed in theater because of good ITV. 32 However, we were not 100%
successful. According to an armor officer writing in Armor Magazine his task force "limped into Baghdad due to extremely limited class IX resupply during the war." 33 Even when they arrived in Baghdad and remained stationary the situation did not improve. Five weeks after arriving in Baghdad 0 of 30 tanks and 7 of 14 Bradley Fighting Vehicles were operational. 34 This was the first time the just-in-time concept was tried but users did not have ITV and did not have confidence in the just-in-time system. Users believe that just-in-time systems force them to live day to day even during combat and stability operations. In the chaotic environment of combat it is extremely difficult to get items to the user reliably every day. Class IX supplies are critical for operations and show the need for complete visibility and control.
The experience of the Marines is instructive as they were successful in supporting the operations of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), but they used a system developed for only this operation and it only supported Marine requirements. 35 They did not have in-transit visibility below the division level which, once again, led to work-arounds and multiple off-line requests.
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In fact off-line requests outnumbered automated requests. 37 were unloaded, or who signed for the equipment. 38 One has to ask if cross Service balancing could have alleviated the problem of class IX supply for both the Army and Marines. However it appears neither branch had the visibility or distribution systems to make that happen.
The results of OIF indicate that we still have work to do. Transportation systems are a major constraint and information systems are still not mature enough for command and control for a just-in-time system. The TPFDD process broke down due to the dynamic nature of the operation, which then resulted in loss of confidence in the system and ad-hoc work-arounds.
Total asset visibility was not achieved. Although it was better than previous operations, it did not reach down to the tactical user. The OIF experience reinforces the fact that the US has the most effective logistics system in the world, but it lacks flexibility and relies on mass to compensate for risk and weaknesses. 39 When we tried to reduce mass, we had shortages.
Combatant commanders and joint task force commanders do not have an integrated logistics information system nor is there a source of accurate real-time information on which to base such a system. Logistics information systems are Service specific, invaluable to the Service but fragmented at the JTF Combatant Command level. 40 Current logistics doctrine does not support a high velocity, just-in-time system.
TRENDS IN LOGISTICS
The trends in logistics theory will add to the problems already discussed. Today's logistician operates in an information age world. This means logisticians can have access to more information than ever before. On-line systems give logisticians the ability to determine where items are and when they will arrive. 41 Total asset visibility is close to fruition. We live in a world where FedEx has the technology to track an item from the time it is dropped off to the time it is delivered. 42 Civilian corporations have reduced inventory by leveraging information.
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Large stand-by inventory and excess capacity are a thing of the past in the commercial world;
relics of the industrial age.
Logistics will be a worldwide enterprise in the Global War on Terror. Joint Vision 2020 says there will be a greater focus on CONUS based power projection. 44 The United States will use rapidly deployable expeditionary joint forces projecting balanced sustained waves of capability that will fight while deploying and on arrival. 45 Emerging military logistics concepts are described in the Focused Logistics Campaign Plan (FLCP) published by the Joint Staff J-4. 46 The J-4 envisages real time web-based information systems providing accurate, actionable visibility as part of a common relevant operational picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across joint forces, Services, and support agencies. 47 The FLCP's goal is faster deployment of mission ready forces and their support, reduced support footprint, and reduced logistics costs. 48 The key revolutionary change is a shift from mass to velocity.
The Focused Logistics campaign plan starts by explicitly stating that the shift from a supply based logistics system (mass) to a leaner more agile distribution based system is ongoing. 49 Each Service is reducing inventory and relying on high velocity transportation and reach back through information systems to meet their legal responsibilities to support their component's forces.
Air Force Trends
The 51 Its approach to logistics transformation is based on a nodal system emphasizing a global distribution based high-velocity system using information and speed in the pipeline to provide support to the Air Force warfighter. 52 This nodal concept worked will when USAFE was supporting both Operations NOBIL ANVIL and IRAQI FREEDOM. 53 It's focus is on distribution.
For the Air Force, combat support has evolved from a theater-centric model to a global perspective, that is why its combat support system will be based on a global nodal system for sustainment. However, it will still rely on theater based systems for fuel, distribution, and storage of munitions, and prepositioning assets for beddown at forward operating locations. 54 The Air Force envisions coordinating at the theater level when selecting and developing support concepts for Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) and would continue to work with joint theater logisticians to select FOLs and support them. But, the actual sustainment system would come from the global system.
Navy/Marine Corps Trends
The Navy and Marine Corps are moving to integrate their logistics systems and are developing a logistics system founded on their sea basing concept in Sea Power 21. 55 The
Marines current logistics system requires them to build up a capability on shore then move forward with ground based Lines of Communication (LOC)s. In the future logistics support will be provided from ships at sea thus freeing the Marines from land based LOCs. They will use the Naval distribution system to flow logistics through the sea base and then provide it when and where it is need either by airlift from the sea base or fast delivery ships like LCACs that can move inland quickly. 56 MAGTFs will operate from the sea base meaning that they will close and reconstitute forces at sea. The primary enabler will be coupling ship to objective distribution with a network based automated information system to provide in-stride sustainment for maneuvering and fighting forces. In other words, just-in-time distribution from the sea. All
Combat Service Support (CSS), warehousing and distribution will occur on the sea base and resupply from CONUS will flow through the sea base to the user. The seabase would be a group of ships networked together and connected to the user ashore with each ship providing a part of the logistics support. 57 Naval thinkers view this as an enabler for a JTF commander because it frees naval and marine forces from the need for host-nation support. However, the concept is limited in its "jointness". Seabased logistics is designed to make an expeditionary force more self sufficient. Marine landing forces will continue to be sustained by Naval logistics even when established ashore. 58 However, the Marine force will still be part of a larger theater logistics effort under naval logistics. This concept does not rule out support through strategic lift from the United States but rather emphasizes naval support or a combination of strategic lift and Naval logistics for large operations.
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Army Trends
The Army has been moving to a transportation based system since 1996. The Chief of
Staff of the Army stated we want to move to a transportation based system as rapidly as we can. . ." 60 The Army has reduced stocks to make this happen. 63 This concept was tested in an Army-JFCOM exercise (Unified Quest 03) and validated the need for coordination of logistics over long distances on future battlefields. The current vision is based on the TSC with an air logistics element and a Naval logistics element commanded by a functional logistics command who is co-equal with the other component commanders.
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All the Services put a premium on the two things that are most constraining in current military logistics systems transportation and information systems. Distribution based logistics systems require a robust transportation network optimized by a sophisticated information management systems. This enables replacing mass with velocity. It is utterly dependent on the ability to dynamically observe, manage, and control material in motion.
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A NEW PRINCIPLE FOR LOGISTICS
Logistics command and control needs to be compatible with historical lessons and the logistics visions already discussed. The question is how best to command and control logistics.
Some propose giving one Service logistics responsibility, others advocate a new theater command. 66 Neither option addresses the true nature of logistics in the future.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
In the future logistics operations will have characteristics similar to airpower. The principles of war apply to high velocity logistics in a similar way that they apply to airpower.
Unity of command, objective, maneuver, economy of force, and simplicity all impact logistics and airpower in a similar way.
Problems of the past combined with trends in logistics will have theater wide impact. The principle of unity of effort means "all efforts should be directed and coordinated toward a common objective." 67 This principle emphasizes the idea of directing all efforts to a common objective. 68 Independent service logistics systems working on their own do not provide unity of effort in the theater. In the past our logistics system did not need unity of effort and was not very efficient because it didn't have to be. We were willing to build up huge stockpiles just-incase they were needed. We moved significantly more material than we actually used because it was the only way to reduce risk. 69 But this is not the future for logistics. Airpower history proves an efficient just-in-time system, requires unity of command for success. The only way to effectively control limited airpower and still have the flexibility to direct it where it was needed on the dynamic battlefield was to put it under a single commander. In logistics we cooperated by coordinating different Service needs and deconflicting transportation requirements in planning through the JOPES system. However, in all operations since Operation Desert Storm the unity of effort was lost because the plan changed on implementation. Future logistics support will be the product of multiple capabilities from multiple services just as airpower is the product of many different types of aircraft from each Service. Unity of command is essential to effectively fuse diverse capabilities. 70 On the dynamic and fast moving battlefield, logistics will have to be directed to the locations needed as the situation changes.
Historical experience and future trends also show that the principles of objective and economy of force will apply to logistics the same way that they apply to airpower. From the airmen's perspective the principle of objective shapes priorities and helps concentrate on theater priorities. Airpower is susceptible to siphoning to fragmented objectives because it is a limited resource. The principle of Economy of Force says that minimum power should be devoted to secondary objectives. 71 Logistics will be a constrained asset and have similar characteristics. If we continue to pursue current initiatives, we will have to focus our resources on theater objectives and control them at a higher level.
Airpower's ability to maneuver is not only a product of speed and range, but also flows from its flexibility and versatility when planning and executing operations. 72 Logistics will also have to have flexibility and versatility. If we are to avoid shortages like those in OIF, we must have the agility to support fast moving forces. Distribution on the move will require flexibility and versatility similar to airpower.
The JFACC's ability to use the special capabilities of each Service to orchestrate air campaigns shows that specialization is necessary but centralized control and decentralized execution are required.
TENETS OF LOGISTICS
A key tenet of airpower is centralized control and decentralized execution. Airmen have learned over time that the best way to employ airpower was through centralized control.
Centralized control allows commanders to focus on priorities that lead to victory. Through centralized control commanders give coherence, guidance and organization to the effort.
Logistics like airpower will be a constrained resource made up of many specialized parts contributing to the campaign. However, logistics like airpower will require decentralized execution. "Delegation of execution authority to lower level commanders is essential to achieve effective span of control and foster initiative, responsiveness, and flexibility." 73 Each Service is best able to support its own logistics needs and equipment. There is much commonality in support, bulk fuel and food are examples, but there are also enough unique logistics aspects that each service must still support its own requirements.
The FLCP envisions each Service fulfilling its unique support needs while focusing on a common objective and supporting each other when necessary. Each Service's logistics system will exploit its capabilities for a common purpose and objective, but needs to maintain its flexibility and execution through local commanders.
Air power is flexible and versatile it can be employed against a variety of targets and can change focus quickly. 74 Logistics planners seek to include these tenets in future operations.
The focused logistics campaign plan says "we will provide a fully enabled mobility system to optimize rapid projection, delivery, handoff. . . at the place and time required to support rapid maneuver." 75 Logistics must achieve concentration of purpose, priority, and balance. If dispersion of effects results from high demand there are three risks: (1) failing to achieve operational objectives (while achieving tactical objectives); (2) delaying or diminishing effects; (3) increasing attrition. 76 Historically we have had dispersion of logistics but avoided problems by moving mountains of material. Logistics historically is the limiting factor in the speed of operations and it can increase attrition through lack of support of war fighters.
These principles and tenets of airpower employment led the Air Force to develop the JFACC. It is based on hard lessons on the employment of airpower going back to WWII. The JFACC concept was validated in Desert Storm and has been used successfully ever since. 77 Given the similarities between the tenets of airpower and future logistics theory it is time to consider a JFACC like approach for logistics. Since Desert Shield/Desert Storm the Air Force has invested in Air Operations Centers and training to enable the JFACC to command and control airpower. The result is a sophisticated command and control system that gives commanders fully visibility of the air campaign as well as the ability to control and redirect it.
HOW THE JFACC WORKS
In joint doctrine the JFACC exploits the capabilities of joint aerospace operations through a cohesive joint plan and a responsive integrated control system. 78 He plans coordinates, allocates tasks executes and assesses aerospace operations. 79 He has a theater-wide perspective. Joint doctrine also states the JFACC should be the component commander with the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan task and control joint air operations. The JFLogCC would also provide objective and economy of force for the theater commander. He will be able to shape logistics priorities to align with theater priorities.
Currently, there is no logistics function with the authority to do this other than in an ad-hoc manner using the five options in the focused campaign plan. There is no one watching for redundancy in support, efficient use of lift, or monitoring to ensure there is no siphoning of logistics capability to purposes that are not in line with the combatant commander's priorities.
The JFLogCC can ensure economy of force by controlling the flow of support in the theater and eliminating redundancy that will free up limited transportation assets and make them both efficient and effective.
The focused logistics campaign plan seeks a logistics system that can match the rapid maneuver envisioned by the future force. This concept is called distributed logistics, but it requires is flexibility and versatility. The JFLogCC will enable distributed logistics by being able to change focus quickly, direct support from the closest unit, and direct assets where they are needed. This capability does not exist now.
The JFLogCC will provide concentration of purpose, priority, and balance. Logistics is vulnerable to dispersion of effects resulting from high demand, the risk of failing to achieve operational objectives (while achieving tactical objectives) by delaying or diminishing support can be mitigated with central control of logistics and by a commander viewing requirements across the theater.
Finally and most importantly the JFLogCC will be able to meet the needs of the war fighter. The most important function of logistics is to get the right thing to the right place at the right time to support the war fighter. The JFLogCC gives the opportunity to do this more effectively and efficiently than ever before. It will be the ability to command and control logistics that will make this concept work. The Army's TSC concept and its potential investment in the TSC command and control systems will bring this capability to reality.
CONCLUSION
The drive of transformation in the focused logistics campaign plan makes it clear that we will no longer move iron mountains as we have in the past and that we will replace mass with velocity to mitigate logistics risk. The history of logistics command and control and the trends in the environment indicate the logistics system must update its method of command and control to meet the needs envisioned the in the focused logistics campaign plan. However the plan falls short of meeting the need in the five options given the theater commander. These are ad-hoc approaches to the problem. A doctrinal, equipment, and training solution needs to be established so it can be developed and practiced. The logistics environment of the future demands expertise and doctrine that can not be thrown together ad-hoc. The characteristics of logistics in the future will resemble the characteristics of airpower we can use the JFACC as a model for commanding and controlling logistics. The Service that provides the JFLogCC for joint operations will be the one that like the Air Force, invests in command and control and training and equipment to achieve it. The Army is stepping up to this challenge. The concept of a JFACC to control airpower developed over many years. We can save time and expense by using this concept for logistics. We need a JFLogCC to control logistics. He/she will provide the unity of effort simplicity and objective and economy of force needed for tomorrow's logistics systems.
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